

We negate:

Resolved: The U.S. Federal Government **should increase** its **diplomatic efforts** to **peacefully** resolve **internal armed conflicts** in West Asia.

Contention 1: Terror

US Pivot

[Peries. 22 notes](#), the US is now abandoning their countries reorienting US foreign policy to the Indo-Pacific.

Terrorism is at an all time low

[Visions of Humanity 22 finds](#) that terrorism is globally at its lowest level and has shifted out of West into South Asia.

Plus, the origins of terror have changed, and the traditional hotbed in the middle east has declined sharply.

While religious terrorism has seen a sharp decline, political terrorism has risen steadily, particularly in the West, accounting for 73% of attacks. Political terrorism has now overtaken religious terrorism, with religiously motivated attacks declining 82%.

However, the pro would revive perceptions of intervention by supporting civil society organizations.

[O'Reagan 21 notes](#), Beyond material support, U.S. policy emphasizes **diplomatic engagement** and appearances alongside civil society groups to increase their visibility and influence in other countries.

This is problematic because they often fail

U.S. civil society support is more likely to be directed by the U.S. as opposed to local non gov organizations.

As a result:

O'Regan futhers,

Violent protests occur more frequently and in countries with high levels of inequality. Taken together, there is a potentially troubling relationship between civil society organizations, political instability, and political violence.

The consequence of US involvement is dire, as Nation building efforts lead to terrorism

As Thrall 17 [finds](#), nation building efforts cause more problems than they solve, including spawning more anti-American sentiment and creating the conditions that lead to terrorism.

Thus,

Anti-American attitudes undermine US security and increase the threat of terrorism and decrease the likelihood of cooperation with other nations.

[Hayes 18 finds](#), The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out.

This could escalate and have deadly consequences,

If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets.

The impact is extinction

Abratov 20 [calculates](#), Such a conflict might culminate with an exchange of nuclear strikes taking as long as just a few hours. During those hours, hundreds of millions of people in the northern hemisphere would be killed, and everything created by human civilization in the last thousand years would be destroyed.

Contention Two is China

Subpoint a: China is filling-in for US disengagement in West Asia

Many in the region today believe that the US is checked out.

Thus Xi is going to be welcomed by Saudi Arabia.

And China has been careful in building its influence in a politically volatile geography, managing the regional fault lines and remaining distant from getting embroiled. Iran's geography is critical for its BRI for Iran, like the Gulf, China offers an alternative to its dealings with the West.

This is critical because:

China is more effective at resolving regional issues and is developing the region. It offers soft power to Middle Eastern countries in economic opportunities

[Kubba 22 notes](#), China released its plan for achieving peace, security, and stability. Stopping geopolitical rivalry in favor of dialogue in Syria, Yemen, and Libya . Recognition of Palestine in a two-state solution; Iranian commitment to non-proliferation; combat terrorism and advance deradicalization; and developing the region through economic cooperation.

A policy of incremental Saudi-Iran engagement is the need of the hour. This could be better facilitated by China than by the U.S.

Subpoint b: US diplomacy is reactive and crowds out necessary peace

[Kubba 22 concludes](#), Antagonistic stances on issues related to security, economics, technology, and ideology have largely crystallized, leaving little space for the adjustments that could relieve simmering tensions.

The US approach has been to push China out; however, it can apply pressure on its allies to repel Chinese engagement. This approach is not sustainable. The U.S. cannot keep trying to regulate [West Asia].

Finally, Chinese leadership is key to move Saudi-Iran rivalry away from a warpath

As [Janardhan 20](#) notes,

Even if Saudi-Iran rapprochement does not yield total peace, China's diplomatic and security roles in the region could contribute to helping them develop into 'rivalry partners' – possibly like China and the U.S. themselves or even like the evolving China-India ties, after realizing that war would be disastrously inconclusive.

Thus we negate.

Summary Extensions

That solves US involvement — China will better broker talks

Kubba 22 (Sama Kubba – Harvard University undergraduate, “The Middle East as a Sphere for US-China Cooperation,” 4-21-22,

<https://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2022/04/21/the-middle-east-as-a-sphere-for-us-china-cooperation/>)

The U.S. and China should work together on diplomatic discussions to stabilize conflict in the Middle East. **China frames itself as a neutral “friend” to all Middle Eastern [West Asian] countries,** thus **acting as an intermediary**. **The Chinese government plans to invite Israelis and Palestinians to hold talks in China, a conflict the U.S. has a lengthy history with** and to which it sees itself as central. China most likely cares about the Israel-Palestine conflict to protect investment in Israeli technology firms, Israel’s involvement in BRI, and the belief in Palestine’s right to state sovereignty. China recognized Palestine in 1988 as a way of gaining popularity in the Arab world, maintaining positive relations since, and has outlined its support for a two-state solution in its 2016 Arab Policy Paper. The Biden administration donates to The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s mission in Palestine while supporting Israel’s national security objectives, thus making the U.S. an essential partner to both parties. In addition, Israel recently formed a new quad in the Middle East/Central Asia with the U.S., India, and the UAE to highlight Israel’s growth since the Abraham Accords. The Trump administration’s work with the Abraham Accords gives the U.S. leverage over Israel, which could be crucial in these negotiations given Israel’s relative strength over Palestine.

CARDS

Contention One is Terror

US pivoting away from West Asia

Peries from November (Justine Peries, 11-19-2022, "New US Geopolitical Strategies: A Pivot to the Indo-Pacific," MIR,

<https://www.mironline.ca/new-us-geopolitical-strategies-a-pivot-to-the-indo-pacific/>, DOA: 12-6-2022)ET

Until 2013, the U.S. had been intensively engaged in the Middle East for nearly two decades. After invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US focused on liberalizing the region, dedicating its efforts to democratizing the two states. Through military deployment, agreements, and numerous investments, the U.S., protecting its interests, became the strongest external power in the Middle East.

However, after years of occupation that “...left policymakers—and the [American] public—exhausted,” the US is changing its geopolitical strategy. Today, the Biden administration appears to be seeking to reduce military presence in the Middle East while insisting that the US will **not leave** the region, even as Middle Eastern allies raise concerns that the US is now **abandoning** their countries. **In the meantime, a new goal is emerging: reorienting US foreign policy to the**

Indo-Pacific. A Pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The pivot to Asia is not a new strategy. Indeed, the Biden administration’s two predecessors had already taken an interest in the region. Former US President Barack Obama was the first to **step away** from the Middle East and turn U.S.’s foreign policy to Asia, with the goal of “expanding trade and investment [and] forging a **broad-based military presence**” while strengthening bilateral **relations with China**. In contrast, Trump’s main interest was building up the Indo-Pacific into a “**free, open, and inclusive**” region and building a coalition based on the “**Quad**” of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India. This alliance would be committed to **containing China** and its expansion in the Pacific region. The Trump administration further laid the groundwork for America’s geopolitical interest in the region with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), aimed at developing “a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and **principled US policy** for the Indo-Pacific region.” Indeed ARIA calls on the US to

enhance security cooperation with its allies, Japan and South Korea but also sets a guideline for good governance in the region. As envisioned by the US, this role would include the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. **Although the interest in Asia is not new, the steps America takes to enhance its economic and military strategies in this region are becoming more explicit.** This shift reflects the deterioration of America's power in the Middle East and the advance of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. While the previous administration developed the gist of the Asian Pivot's geopolitics goals, analysts have noted that "the US Indo-Pacific policy lacked geo-economic heft." As a result, under President Biden's administration, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework was proposed to support America's economic ambitions. According to Middle East policy expert Karim Sadjapour, moving efforts and resources to Asia rather than the Middle East reflects America's economic realities. ASEAN accounts for 7.3 per cent of all US imports, and trade with the Indo-Pacific supports more than **three million jobs** in the US. The national interest of the American hegemony, which is on the verge of being displaced by an increasingly "aggressive" China, is at stake. In its 2022 report, the Whitehouse stated that "PRC's coercion and aggression span the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific." Accordingly, the Biden administration sees the Indo-Pacific as crucial to maintaining America's position as a superpower. With this in mind, the administration strives to reinforce its network of allies in the region. The US government is pointing out harmful actions taken against its partners by China, like the country's "economic pressure on Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing **pressure on Taiwan.**" American Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, explicitly acknowledged the US's strategy of deepening "...America's **bonds** with [its] allies and partners..." to assemble **a united front** against China based on common security and economic threats. Military efforts are also being emphasized. The US is working on deploying military resources to **Guam** and increasing the presence of "US air, land and sea **capabilities**" at Australian military installations. The trilateral security partnership AUKUS was announced in September 2021 to enhance regional alliances and defend the U.S.' interests. This pact between the US, the UK, and Australia allows for **sharing of intelligence** related to nuclear technology. Most importantly, it would strengthen the Quad's security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific. The US is now worried about the security challenges emerging with China. However, ISIS' loss of momentum, the botched departure from Afghanistan, the signing of the **Abraham Accords** (which normalized Israel's ties with the UAE), and the Israel-Morocco and Israel-Sudan normalization agreements are all reasons why the U.S. stopped prioritizing the Middle East. **while the US appears to be disengaging, there is no question of abandoning the region. Instead, the "maximalist goals" of democracy and regional transformation that were once emphasized in the Middle East are now priorities in the Indo-Pacific. The Whitehouse strategy in [West Asia] the Middle East is now more narrow and targeted.**

And terrorism is at an all time low

Visions of Humanity 2022 (Visions of Humanity, Destination for peace providing research, data, editorial and analysis of the world today. 2022. "Trends in Terrorism [2022]", Visions of Humanity, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/trends-in-terrorism/>. DOA: 12/15/2022) SAP

Of all the indicators of global peace, terrorism impact recorded the third largest improvement. 86 countries recorded an improvement, while 18 countries recorded deteriorations. This represents a long-term trend in which the total deaths from terrorism have been falling steadily since 2015. There are several multifaceted reasons why these changes have occurred, and the result is that **terrorism is globally at its lowest level in the history** of the GPI. This change is represented by several notable global and regional trends. Geographical Trends **The epicentre of terrorism has shifted out of [West Asia] the Middle East and North Africa, and into South Asia,** with countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan recording poor scores in the terrorism impact indicator. The impact of terrorism has increased in the sub-Saharan African region, especially in the Sahel where armed conflict has become a key driver of terrorist activity. Terrorism in the Sahel has risen sharply over the last five years and attacks have become more frequent and more deadly. IS and its affiliates have shifted their focus away from the Middle East as the Syrian conflict has subsided and this has been a key driver in the increase in terrorism in the Sahel. Terrorism in the Sahel accounted for 35% of the total of terrorism deaths globally in 2021, an enormous increase from only 1% in 2007. Ideological Trends IEP's definition of terrorism suggests that: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three broad categories: political, nationalist/separatist, and religiously motivated terrorism. While all acts of terrorism are inherently political, the major point of difference between the types of terrorism is the goal. For example, far-right terrorism is classified as a form of political terrorism, whereas when the goal or motivation is explicitly religious, the act is defined as religious terror. Difficulty arises when attempting to delineate between the types of terrorism, as there is a great deal of intersectionality between these categories. However, most terrorist groups have a primary purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of these three groups. Over the past decade, religious terrorism has been the deadliest form of terrorism. Islamist groups or lone actors have been responsible for 528 deaths in the West since 2007, representing 60% of deaths. This reached a peak of 457 deaths in the two years between 2015 and 2017. 2021 recorded the lowest number of attacks and deaths attributed to religious terrorism since 2013. While religious terrorism has seen a sharp decline, political terrorism has risen steadily over the last decade, particularly in the West, accounting for 73% of attacks. Political terrorism has now overtaken religious terrorism in the West, with **religiously motivated attacks declining 82% in 2021**. There were 40 politically motivated attacks last year, compared with just three religiously motivated attacks.

However, aff would revive perceptions of intervention by supporting civil society organizations

O'Regan 2021(Davin O'Regan, Davin O'Regan is a post-doctoral research associate at the [Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland](#), He researches the role of civil society in civil conflicts, both violent and nonviolent, among other topics. Previously he has worked as a senior program officer at the U.S. Institute of Peace and as a research associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 6-30-2021, "Ending Forever Wars But Not Interventionism: Rethinking U.S. Civil Society Assistance Policy," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/ending-forever-wars-but-not-interventionism-rethinking-u-s-civil-society-assistance-policy/>, DOA: 12-6-2022)ET

What does it mean to exercise “restraint” in foreign policy? Increasingly, the term is associated with the use of military force. With [campaign promises](#) to “end forever wars,” extricate the U.S. from “unwinnable conflicts,” and rely first and foremost on tools of diplomacy and alliances. President Joe Biden has indicated a strong preference for a more restrained approach to U.S. grand strategy. Restraint has found increasing bipartisan support in Washington, D.C., with substantial numbers of [progressives on the left](#) and “America First” [populists](#) supporting reductions in U.S. interventions in the internal politics of other countries. **But should the U.S. demonstrate restraint in other, non-military areas of foreign policy? As support for restraint appears to grow in America’s strategic community, other forms of intervention are likely to persist.** **Engagement with civil society organizations in developing countries is a central element of Biden’s foreign policy.** [A recurrent campaign promise](#) was to host a 2021 Summit for Democracy featuring “civil society organizations from around the world that stand on the frontlines of defense of democracy.” **Supporting civil society organizations differs from U.S. military campaigns but extending material support to on-the-ground actors that try to advance political change in other countries is a form of political intervention. It is also a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. policy** — from President George W. Bush’s [Freedom Agenda](#) to President Barack Obama’s [Stand with Civil Society Initiative](#) — that may be due for reconsideration. **Current U.S. practices are encumbered by overly expansive and inconsistent expectations, are not clearly supported by available evidence, and expose the U.S. to credible charges that it advances double standards.** Future material support for civil society groups abroad should reduce the political or advocacy dimensions of such assistance and focus more on services and humanitarian projects. It should also be based on strategies developed cooperatively with other governments, and feature more circumspect rhetoric from U.S. policymakers. These are difficult and fraught recommendations to make, but they are more consistent with a restrained and less interventionist approach to foreign policy. [U.S. Support for Civil Society.](#) **U.S. expectations for civil society organizations are very ambitious. They are also based on an understanding of how civil society groups operate that features some internal tensions. This unclear framing likely sends mixed signals to foreign leaders about U.S. intentions and objectives.** Civil society is commonly associated with nongovernmental organizations and associations created and maintained voluntarily by citizens to advance or protect shared values or material interests. Though broad, this conceptualization is largely shared across [U.S. Agency for International Development](#) and the [State Department](#). The 2014 [presidential memorandum](#) launching the Stand with Civil Society Initiative highlighted some common examples, including “nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.” Each year almost [\\$500 million](#) of U.S. assistance is extended to civil society organizations abroad, though a good chunk of this money is [channeled through](#) large U.S. or international nongovernmental organizations. **Beyond material support, U.S. policy emphasizes diplomatic engagement and appearances alongside civil society groups to increase their visibility and influence in other countries.** The outcomes associated with a “strong” civil society are as broad as the concept itself. They are “[an essential ingredient of development](#)” and a way to “[reduce global fragility](#),” according to advocates. The Obama administration’s [2015 National Security Strategy](#) encapsulates these vast expectations in one paragraph: Through civil society, citizens come together to hold their leaders accountable and address challenges. Civil society organizations often drive innovations and develop new ideas and approaches to solve social, economic, and political problems that governments can apply on a larger scale. Moreover, by giving people peaceful avenues to advance their interests and express their convictions, a free and flourishing civil society

contributes to stability and helps to counter violent extremism. Policymakers prefer to highlight that civil society actors are assertive but operate through conventional political methods. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development [2013 Strategy](#) on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance explains that the agency “will invest in building the capacity of CSOs [civil society organizations] to perform analytical research, gather data, present findings, and advocate on issues that promote accountable governance.” **Despite this emphasis on institutional methods, policymakers have not shied from linking past support to civil society to more contentious political tactics, including nonviolent regime change.** Touting “[the Bush record](#),” a White House website argued that George W. Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda “supported the emergence of democracies in Georgia and Ukraine through its support for civil society and democratic activists during the successful Rose Revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in Ukraine.” **While the Obama administration was more circumspect and hesitant — famously paraphrasing the president’s post-Iraq war doctrinal principle as “don’t do stupid shit” — his team also lauded the role of civil society groups in nonviolent conflicts.** During [a speech in May 2011](#), Obama explained that “we intend to provide assistance to civil society, including those that may not be officially sanctioned, and who speak uncomfortable truths. ... For the fact is, real reform does not come at the ballot box alone.” These bold if deliberately vague claims may have been the product of the heady days of the Arab Spring, but [a senior adviser on Middle East policy](#) recognized that the Obama administration was embracing elements of his predecessor’s Freedom Agenda. In another great irony of history, whereas the younger [President] Bush had for all practical purposes abandoned that agenda [i.e., the Freedom Agenda] by the end of his presidency, Obama — driven by unexpected public uprisings in the [Middle East] region — would soon find himself trying to implement it. **These claims cast U.S. engagement with civil society in a different light. Beyond merely anodyne attempts to enliven public engagement in policy debates, support for civil society could be viewed as an effort to influence a country’s internal political processes or even lay the organizational basis for regime change efforts, albeit nonviolent ones.** And some [foreign leaders may indeed be confused by these mixed signals.](#) [From the perspective of the Russian political elite](#), “the pattern of color revolutions, democracy promotion and American regime change interventions [e.g., in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan], they view these actions not as different arms of American foreign policy, but as different tools of a unified American policy that seeks to change various countries around the globe to better suit their interests.” When the Russian parliament passed legislation in 2012 to curb foreign funding of Russian nongovernmental organizations, an architect of the bill [cited regime change](#) as a motive for the law: “There is so much evidence about regime change in Yugoslavia, now in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, in Kosovo — that’s what happens in the world, some governments are working to change regimes in other countries.” Prominent Chinese public intellectuals subsequently praised the Russian nongovernmental organization law, including one former People’s Liberation Army major general [who argued](#) in 2014 that “Chinese authorities should eliminate the danger brought by pro-Western agents ... We can learn from Russia by introducing a ‘foreign agent law,’ so as to block the way for infiltration of external forces and eliminate the possibilities of a color revolution.” Nor are Russia and China the only governments expressing wariness of foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations. In 2012, then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [questioned the role](#) of U.S.-funded nongovernmental groups for their involvement in anti-nuclear power protests.

Civil society organizations generally fail

O’Regan 2021

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[Ironically, while U.S. policymakers sometimes rhetorically link civil society support with nonviolent regime change, a significant proportion of U.S. civil society assistance may have very limited influence on such dynamics. In countries where the U.S. has a strong strategic partnership with or interests in stabilizing an existing regime, U.S. civil society support is more likely to be directed to U.S. as opposed to local nongovernmental organizations in order to maintain control and accountability over what recipient organizations do.](#) In other contexts where U.S. relations with the incumbent regimes are more **[tenuous, foreign-funded activists face a high likelihood of future regulatory obstacles or government interference if they engage in pressure tactics. Such interference would imperil their ability to obtain subsequent foreign support, and so they pursue a survival strategy and engage mostly in "tame" activities that are unlikely to challenge the status quo.](#)** This represents another potential shortcoming of U.S. civil society policy: **[At the highest levels, policymakers advance bold claims that unnerve other governments but on the ground, the work is usually more ambiguous and reserved. However, given the stakes, politicians in other countries can hardly be faulted for wondering about U.S. government statements about the role of civil society in political reforms and nonviolent regime change — including the Biden administration's signaling of strong engagement with civil society organizations. Do civil society organizations meet the lofty expectations of policymakers? Do they contribute to stability and reform? The evidence for any such relationships is mixed.](#)** For example, across municipalities in Bolivia, **[the number of nongovernmental organizations present in a city or town is positively associated with street protest events, particularly where electoral fraud is more common or confidence in elections is low.](#)** Carew Boulding, the researcher behind [this analysis](#), notes the following: **[Instead of acting as training grounds for the type of citizenship we associate with developed democracies, \[nongovernmental organizations\] may also be invoking much more contentious and less predictable forms of participation.](#)** Protest may well be a necessary and vital part of democratic participation, but it is rarely what advocates of civil society have in mind when they advocate for [nongovernmental organizations]. **[These conclusions were similar to those from another study that found a sometimes positive relationship between civil society mobilization and civil war onset and warned "that donors should earmark and allocate funds carefully in countries with underdeveloped or struggling \[civil society organizations\]."](#)** Other studies have found that as **[international nongovernmental organizations focused on human rights increase their presence within countries, violent protests occur more frequently and that in countries with high levels of inequality, civil society may be coopted by the state to more efficiently target certain identity groups with state-based violence.](#)** Taken together, these studies point to a **[potentially troubling relationship between civil society organizations, political instability, and political violence.](#)**

Nation building efforts lead to terrorism

Thrall and Goepner 2017(A. Trevor Thrall, Trevor Thrall is a senior fellow for Cato Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department, with expertise in international security and the politics of American national security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government where he teaches courses in international security. Thrall’s research includes work on shifting American attitudes toward foreign policy, the role of arms sales in U.S. foreign policy, and grand strategy. Most recently he is the coauthor, with John Glaser and Christopher A. Preble, of [Fuel to the Fire: How Trump Made America’s Broken Foreign Policy Even Worse \(and How We Can Recover\)](#) (Cato Institute, 2019). He also edited, with Ben Friedman, [U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint](#) (Routledge, 2018). Thrall has published articles in a range of academic journals, and his shorter commentary on foreign affairs has appeared in a number of publications, including *The Atlantic*, the *Washington Post*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Foreign Policy*, the *Detroit News*, the *Huffington Post*, *War on the Rocks*, and the *National Interest*. Thrall was the cohost of the [Power Problems](#) podcast, a biweekly podcast that explores key questions in international security with guests from across the political spectrum. Prior to working at George Mason, Thrall taught at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, where he directed the MPP and MPA programs. Thrall holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, [Erik Goepner](#), 26 June 2017, "Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/step-back-lessons-us-foreign-policy-failed-war-terror>, DOA: 12-6-2022)ET

A careful reading of the lessons from the past 15 years indicates that the U.S. should abandon the existing strategy in the Middle East for three reasons. First, military intervention and **nation building efforts, even at current “light footprint” levels, cause more problems than they solve, including spawning more antiAmerican sentiment and creating, rather than diminishing, the conditions that lead to terrorism.**⁶ Second, in contrast to the dire picture painted by many observers, including President Trump, the terrorism threat is too small to justify either the existing strategy or more military intervention. Finally, given the first two arguments, the costs of a forward-deployed strategy to fight terrorism are simply too high.⁷

Glick et al 2010 confirm ([Peter Glick](#) , [Susan T. Fiske](#) , [Dominic Abrams](#), [Benoit Dardenne](#) , [Maria Christina Ferreira](#) , [Roberto Gonzalez](#), [Christopher Hachfeld](#) , [Li-li Huang](#) , [Paul Hutchison](#), [Hyun-Jeong Kim](#),[Anna Maria Manganelli](#),[Barbara Masser](#),[Angelica Mucchi-Faina](#) ,[Shinya Okiebisu](#) ,[Nadim Rouhana](#) ,[Jose L. Saiz](#) ,[Nuray Sakalli-Ugurlu](#) ,[Chiara Volpato](#) ,[Mariko Yamamoto](#) , [Vincent Yzerbyt](#), 6-7-2010, "Anti-American Sentiment and America's Perceived Intent to Dominate: An 11-Nation Study," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15324834basp2804_10?casa_token=Ra8szHVIAUsAAA:AA:fYwCvjFHzXqJybj20hHFFFTJyhIoZR2ZcdGlpJaUXt-0LVSlGdOBOP7He05H_owSyJmHDnOVmj8n, DOA: 12-6-2022)ET

Hostile attitudes toward the U.S., its policies, and actions are by no means confined to those who seek to attack America. Paler versions of anti-American hostility are also prevalent among citizens of nations, such as England, that have historically been close allies (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004). **Both more and less extreme anti-American attitudes undermine America’s security. The former increase the threat of terrorism, whereas the latter decrease the likelihood of cooperation with other nations to construct coordinated policies that enhance security. It is therefore vital to understand the nature, the tenor, and the content of anti-American attitudes. A particularly important (as well as convenient) group to examine is the educated youth of other nations, for two reasons. First, the leaders of terrorist organizations are typically well-educated—terrorist attacks are generally conceived and often carried out by young men who were radicalized in their college years**(Amant, 2001). Second, **although it is a cliché to say that “the youth are the future,” it is also true. The educated elite typically exert more political influence and provide the ranks from which future political leaders emerge.** The current study examines attitudes of college students in 11 geographically and culturally diverse nations toward the U.S. . Despite an initial outpouring of sympathy after the 9/11 attacks, global opinion polls have since documented increasingly hostile attitudes toward the U.S. (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002, 2004). The research presented here supplements such opinion polls by examining the psychological characteristics that people in

other nations assign to the U.S. (its government and citizens). We do not attempt to assess the validity of current attitudes toward the U.S., which is a task better suited to political commentators. Rather, we seek to define the general content or “psychological profile” of people’s image of the U.S.. More specifically, we sought to: (a) develop a more detailed picture of the traits and motivations attributed to, and the emotions felt toward, the U.S.; (b) determine the degree to which people in other nations differentiate between the U.S. government and its citizens; and (c) examine how respondents’ attitudes are influenced by their perceptions of the U.S.’ goals and intentions. Our approach was informed by two recent models of intergroup relations, the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) and image theory (IT; Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999), which make predictions about the content of group stereotypes or images. Both theories suggest that the structural factors of a group’s status and power combined with its perceived orientation toward other groups determine stereotypes of the group. The SCM predicts that status and power elevate a group’s perceived competence but that the quality of its

perceived interdependence with other groups (cooperative or competitive) determines the group’s perceived warmth. **The SCM predicts that if it is perceived as cooperative, a high-status group will be viewed as competent and warm, resulting in admiration. If, however, a high-status group is perceived as having competitive goals, it will be viewed as competent and cold, generating resentment. Although IT does not explicitly distinguish between underlying dimensions of competence and warmth, it also suggests that a high-status, powerful group will either be viewed as an ally (trustworthy, well-intentioned, admirable) or as an imperialistic enemy (arrogant, manipulative exploiters).** The latter image is similar to the SCM characterization of competitive, high-status groups (competent but cold or ill-intentioned). In short, both the SCM and IT predict that the prevailing image of high-status groups depends on whether those groups are viewed as having compatible or exploitive goals. There are some differences in the specific dimensions these theories concentrate on, so that some measures used here were inspired by one of the theories and others by both. The purposes of the current study, however, are not to provide a critical test between the theories but to take advantage of their complementary and

overlapping predictions to more completely understand images of the U.S.. **The consequences of viewing a group as both powerful and malevolent are profound. Aggression toward such groups, even if preemptive, can be psychologically justified as a matter of self-defense. Although open state-initiated hostility toward powerful nations may be inhibited by fear of retaliation, terrorist groups do not experience such inhibition, relying instead upon presenting no fixed target that can be easily retaliated against. If there is a widespread consensus within a nation that the U.S. is not only powerful but seeks to dominate, the recruitment of terrorists is undoubtedly aided and the ability of terrorists to count on the passive assistance of the populace** (e.g., sheltering them) **enhances their ability to operate effectively.** The current study examines the attitudes of over 5,000 people (predominantly college students) in 11 geographically and culturally diverse nations, collected shortly after the U.S.’ invasion of Afghanistan but before the invasion of Iraq. In contrast to the Pew polls (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002, 2004), which measure general attitudes about the U.S. (e.g., an overall favorability rating), the current survey examines the psychological profile of impressions of the U.S. in more detail, by using theoretically derived measures from the SCM and IT. These measures include: (a) trait ratings (from the SCM: competence and warmth; from IT: arrogance), (b) subjectively positive and negative emotions specified by the SCM (admiration, contempt, envy), (c) perceptions of underlying goals (domination vs. promotion of human rights) and attitudes (belief in the superiority of the “American way of life”) toward other nations, (d) status and power (resources, military, and economic power, social well-being), (e) reactions to world events (the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan). In addition to providing a more psychologically nuanced, in-depth profile of attitudes about the U.S., the current study is grounded in psychological theory. Specifically, the SCM suggests that a group’s status predicts its perceived competence, whereas perceptions of the group’s orientation toward others (cooperative vs. competitive) predicts its perceived warmth. As Asch (1946) noted, the Gestalt produced by competent–warm and competent–cold impressions are radically different. The former produces favorable emotions (e.g., admiration, respect) and benign perceptions of the target group’s intentions. In contrast, the latter yields strongly negative emotions (e.g., resentment) and suspicions of nefarious intent. Because the power of the U.S. is generally undisputed, the SCM predicts that the U.S. will be perceived as competent, even among those who have strongly negative emotions toward it. In contrast, perceptions of the U.S.’ orientation toward other nations ought to predict whether the U.S. is perceived as warm (or not). Similarly, IT proposes that high-status, competitive groups will be viewed as arrogant imperialists. Both the SCM and IT suggest that whether the U.S. is viewed as cooperative or

competitive will determine whether respondents have favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the U.S.’ actions. **In short, the SCM and IT together suggest that perceiving the U.S. as seeking to dominate (rather than to help) other nations (i.e., as negatively interdependent with the well-being of other nations) will predict more negative reactions toward the U.S.** on (a) trait ratings (from SCM: low ratings on warmth; from IT: high ratings on arrogance), (b) emotion ratings (from SCM: less admiration, more contempt and envy), and (c) evaluations of actions (e.g., the invasion of Afghanistan). In contrast, because the SCM predicts that perceived power, status, and competence are independent from perceived cooperativeness–competitiveness and warmth, perceptions of the U.S.’ dominative intentions were expected to be unrelated to ratings on status and competence-related dimensions (competence, resources, and power). Finally, we sought to determine the degree to which people in other nations distinguish between the U.S. government and its citizens. Although commentators (e.g., Friedman, 2002) have suggested that citizens of other nations regularly make such distinctions, psychological theories of intergroup attitudes typically assume that groups and their members are perceived similarly. Thus, some sections of the questionnaire (depending on random assignment) targeted perceptions of either the U.S. government or its citizens.

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In fact, the number of terrorist attacks skyrocketed in countries that the US has military presence in

Thrall and Goepner 17 (Trevor Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department, with expertise in international security and the politics of American national security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government where he teaches courses in international security, Erik Goepner, an adjunct scholar in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department. A retired colonel from the U.S. Air Force, *CATO Institute*, June 26 2017, "Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror", <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/step-back-lessons-us-foreign-policy-failed-war-terror> // DOA: 3/8/20)JDE

"To investigate the impact of U.S. military intervention, we compared the terror rates between War on Terror states, other Muslim majority countries, the U.S., and the global average. Additionally, we created regression models to examine the significance, if any, of U.S. military strikes when controlling for other variables often used in the study of terrorism such as a state's GDP per capita, economic growth rate, social fractionalization, polity, and education levels (see Appendix 1). As Table 2 reveals, **the number of terror attacks rose an astonishing 1,900 percent in the seven countries that the U.S. either invaded or conducted air strikes in, while other Muslim majority states saw a much more modest 42 percent increase. The regression models also found that countries where the U.S. conducted air or drone strikes saw a dramatic increase in terror attacks compared to countries where the U.S. did not conduct strikes.**"⁵⁰ Even more startling, the models showed the greatest effect when comparing drone strikes conducted in year one with the number of terror attacks carried out two years later, a finding consistent with the theory that **U.S. strikes have a catalyzing effect on terror groups.** In short, contrary to the intentions of the U.S. government, **as the War on Terror has expanded, it has led to greater levels of terrorism."**

And a successful attack is devastating

Hayes 18

(Peter Hayes is Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney. "NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR," *Nautilus Institute*, 1/18/18,

<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/>) dwc 18

Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. **Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric.** Statements by US and North Korea's leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons.//// However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and

reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. //// This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage. even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. //// The possibility that **non-state actors** may **attack without advance warning** as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically **different organizational procedures** and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state **nuclear terrorist** could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or **use actual nuclear materials** and even **warheads against** military or civilian **targets.** If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities.//// If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could **impel a nuclear** armed **state to escalate** its threat or even military actions **against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This** outcome could **trigger** these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent **nuclear war.** especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. //// Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis **when alert levels are already high,** when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, **when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high** due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when **rhetorical threats promising annihilation** on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other **invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve.”** and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, **then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states.** If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. //// The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system?//// Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Impact of a Terrorist Nuclear Threat or Attack on Interstate Nuclear Use Control //// Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack

by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states' motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation.

This causes extinction

Arbatov 20(Alexey Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 12-4-2020, "Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_5, DOA: 7/12/21)ET Nevertheless, these concepts, their dynamics, and their dialectical interrelationship create new problems time and again. They give rise to paradoxes that, were it not a life-and-death matter for modern civilization, could be considered intellectually fascinating. But, unfortunately, these concepts concern actual matters of life and death. **In the current military and political environment, it is no longer inconceivable that war between the U.S. and Russia could break out in just a few days in the event of a crisis. Such a conflict might culminate with an exchange of nuclear strikes taking as long as just a few hours. During those hours, hundreds of millions of people in the northern hemisphere would be killed, and everything created by human civilization in the last thousand years would be destroyed. The direct effects would be irreversible, and the secondary effects would likely kill the rest of the world's population within a number of years, or at least send the remaining population back into a prehistoric existence. The prevention of nuclear war is an indispensable condition for the survival of human civilization, and it is inextricably linked to the concepts of nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, nuclear disarmament, and non-proliferation.** It might seem that all of the above goes without saying, and that all of this has long been accepted both in theory and practice by politicians, military leaders, civilian experts, and the enlightened public of the world's advanced nations. Over the past three decades, the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the U.S. have been reduced substantially—both in terms of the number of warheads and in terms total of destructive power.

Contention Two is China

China is filling-in for US disengagement in West Asia

Teneja 22 (Kavir Taneja – Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation, “China’s emergent footprints in West Asia,” 9-6-22, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-emergent-footprints-in-west-asia/>) //Bos

In a recent statement, **US Special Envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, said that despite a prevailing narrative of American power in West Asia (Middle East) being in recession, the US was not abandoning the region.** “The major message that the (US) president brought to the region is that the U.S. is not going anywhere,” Lenderking told the American media. However, **many in the region today believe that the U.S. (US) in fact checked out a while ago.** US President Joe **Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July came at a contested time. Russia’s war against Ukraine was pushing up global commodity prices, and Europe continues to face a critical energy situation** in the run-up to the winter season. Biden, who had called Saudi a “pariah” state during his campaign, grudgingly met the kingdom’s heir apparent, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has been linked to the murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 by the CIA itself. These moral and ethical red lines for American foreign policy have been a boon for China, which has steadily made space for itself in the region, both politically, and economically, by not bringing to the table any demands on issues such as human rights. This, of course, comes from the fact that Beijing itself is criticised by the United Nations for its treatment of Uyghur Muslims in the country’s Xinjiang province. However, **the Islamic**

world has largely been silent on China's crackdowns in Xinjiang, which gives Beijing the agency to approach its diplomacy from a transactional framework. Amidst all these variables, the US must manoeuvre itself today to make sure it does not play second-fiddle to either Moscow or Beijing. The Islamic world has largely been silent on China's crackdowns in Xinjiang, which gives Beijing the agency to approach its diplomacy from a transactional framework. Recently, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reportedly apologised to the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for a lacklustre response from the White House after Houthi militants attacked facilities in the country. The Houthis, an Iran-backed group, have also gained significant technological prowess in their operational capabilities, such as drones. Barbara Leaf, the US State Department's Senior Middle East official has highlighted that the drones being used by Iran-backed militias in the region were coming from China and that it was ironic that Beijing was doing nothing to control this, whilst at the same time looking to sell defence technologies to Arab states that are pushing back against those very militias. Recent reports claim that Chinese president Xi Jinping's first overseas trip outside of China, since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, is going to be to Saudi Arabia and that unlike the sombre reception given to Biden, Xi is going to be welcomed to Riyadh with all the aplomb possible. The Chinese presence, even if comparatively small for the time being, is causing palpitations in Washington D.C., and beyond. Recent reports of a maritime port being developed by China in the UAE, that could be potentially used for military activities, caused significant friction in Abu Dhabi. The UAE, considered the most powerful state in the Arab world today and a close partner of the US, has used China to hedge its bets against the US, forcing Biden and his predecessors alike to deliver a much more equitable partnership instead of a lopsided one. The UAE had previously bought Chinese Wing Loong drones for its military after the US refused to supply its own MQ-9 'Reaper' drones. More recently, reports also suggest that Abu Dhabi is set to buy Chinese L-15 trainer jets in a bid to diversify suppliers for its military. Many other countries in the Gulf today also bank on controversial Chinese technology giants such as Huawei to build their critical communications infrastructure, raising concerns over the possibility of data leaking into Chinese hands in the future. The UAE, considered the most powerful state in the Arab world today and a close partner of the US, has used China to hedge its bets against the US, forcing Biden and his predecessors alike to deliver a much more equitable partnership instead of a lopsided one. However, Beijing has been careful in building its influence in what is a politically volatile geography, carefully managing the regional fault lines and remaining distant from getting embroiled in local geopolitics. China has learnt lessons from US interventionism, and for a large part, has stayed clear from overt military cooperation with the region, preferring to work largely behind the scenes. All of China's outreach in West Asia as of today is designed for its own economic benefit. In 2021, China and Iran agreed on a 25-year cooperation agreement by some estimates is to be worth around US\$400 billion. China has been looking to increase its cooperation with Iran since the 1980s, however, back then, the US reigned as the world's only superpower. Today, the equations are much different. For China, Iran's geography is critical for its expansive Belt and Road Initiative, and its natural resources, currently frozen by Western sanctions over the state's nuclear program, can be exclusively accessed by China in the future. Meanwhile, for Iran, like the Gulf, China offers an alternative to its dealings with a West that is getting significantly uneasy over the rise of China, not just in Asia, but globally. The increasing cooperation between Iran, China and Russia, now being reflected at forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is being seen as an 'alternative order' to the ethos, ideologies and geopolitics of the West.

China is more effective at resolving regional issues and is developing the region

Kubba 22 (Sama Kubba – Harvard University undergraduate, “The Middle East as a Sphere for US-China Cooperation,” 4-21-22,

<https://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2022/04/21/the-middle-east-as-a-sphere-for-us-china-cooperation/>)

The U.S.' approach has been to push China out; however, it can apply pressure on its allies to repel Chinese engagement. But this approach is not sustainable. The U.S. cannot keep trying to regulate [West Asia] the Middle East nor is it to the benefit of Middle Eastern countries. Instead, the U.S. and China should cooperate by leveraging their comparative advantages to make grand strategy gains in their Middle East foreign policy. Both countries share interests in beating terrorism, containing Iran's nuclear capabilities, preventing Iran from causing chaos in the region, stable oil prices and access to oil, opening up opportunities for economic investment and engagement with Middle Eastern allies, and regional stability. Background: How the U.S. and China Interact with the Middle East China offers soft power to Middle Eastern countries in economic opportunities such as the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI) or investment in technology. China's non-interventionist philosophy per its 1953 "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and focus on win-win opportunities in economic spheres allows it to maintain looser, positive relations and partnerships even with rival states in the region.[i] On the other hand, the U.S. maintains bilateral relations described as "zero-sum" since partnerships are often military alliances that require a more precise definition of commitment, especially as it pertains to conflict.[ii] In March of 2021, China released its five-point plan for achieving peace, security, and stability in the Middle East: 1 – Stopping geopolitical rivalry in favor of dialogue in political hotspots such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya (most likely referring to Saudi-Iran proxy wars); 2 – Recognition of Palestine in a two-state solution; 3 – Iranian commitment to non-proliferation; 4 – combat terrorism and advance deradicalization; and 5 – developing the region through economic cooperation (China-Arab state summits, Belt and Road initiative, investment in new technologies and free trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council).[iii] The U.S. offers both soft and hard power in the form of military assistance and security cooperation, development aid, and projects through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The U.S. also attaches ethical obligations to its partners and its support by advocating for democracy and human rights, which China avoids. The U.S.'s military assistance in the Middle East is unmatched and crucial to providing stability and order to the region, ultimately allowing for China's economic and political activity and engagement. However, Degang Sun, Professor of Political Science at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, has called China's security the "weakest dimension of China's diplomacy in the Middle East." [iv] As the U.S. resizes its commitment to the Middle East and China becomes more involved, Middle Eastern allies have wondered whether China will take on the security demands of the region. Yet, China is not looking to fill the U.S.'s shoes as it focuses on economic and political partnerships to side-step involvement in disputes. At the same time, however, the U.S.'s financing of expensive military operations in the Middle East only to continue encountering conflict in a turbulent region has led China to criticize the U.S.'s defense-heavy, "zero-sum" approach to the Middle East. Instead, China upholds a principle of conflict stabilization through development. Essentially, Chinese leadership believes that the region's troubles are rooted in underdevelopment and can be solved through industrialization and modernization. Unlike the U.S., China does not mention democratization as an element of stability. In fact, China's first Arab policy paper outlines a "1 + 2 + 3" policy for economic development that starts with energy cooperation as its core, flourishes into construction and trade/investment as its "wings," and finally branches into emerging technologies in nuclear energy, aerospace (satellites) and new forms of (clean) energy.[v]

US diplomacy is reactive and crowds out necessary peace

Haenle 22 (Paul Haenle, Sam Bresnick, 2-21-22, "Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478>)

Fifty years ago this week, former U.S. President Richard Nixon flew to China, setting the stage for a dramatic shift in relations between the two countries. Much has changed since that visit, not always for the better. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity over the past year, U.S.-China ties remain tense. Discussions in Alaska and Tianjin yielded few, if any, breakthroughs. While friendlier in tone, the recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden led only to agreements to hold yet more talks, albeit on important issues such as strategic stability. The lone bilateral bright spot has been some cooperation on climate. Since the summit, the Biden administration announced its diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics and added more Chinese companies to its trade restriction list while Congress passed a bill aimed at countering China's forced labor abuses in Xinjiang. The two sides' antagonistic stances on issues related to security, economics, technology, and ideology have largely crystallized, leaving little space for the adjustments that could relieve simmering tensions. Below, Paul Haenle and Sam Bresnick analyze how the two countries got here and how they can move forward. **WHY ARE THE TWO SIDES STUCK?** Former U.S. President Donald Trump ushered in a more confrontational era in U.S.-China relations, and Biden has largely maintained his predecessor's approach to Beijing, albeit with a more equanimous tone and embrace of multilateralism. The U.S. government has for decades been concerned by China's mercantilism, rapid military modernization, and illiberal approach to human rights, but it had held out hope that China might liberalize through increasingly robust contact with the rest of the world.

Chinese leadership is key to move Saudi-Iran rivalry away from a warpath

Janardhan 20 (Narayanappa Janardhan – senior research fellow at the Gulf-Asia Program at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, “Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Diplomatic- Security Tool in the Gulf?,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1728968

9. **Conclusion** The Middle East is riven by conflicts. The common thread running through them at present is the ideological differences and competition primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While this competition has entangled several external powers, China has managed to remain in the good books of both countries. It is increasingly becoming clear that the GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are realising that they have far more to lose than the U.S. or Iran in any escalation with the Islamic Republic. A policy of incremental Saudi-Iran engagement is the need of the hour. This could be better facilitated by China than by the U.S. A pair of Saudi-Iranian analysts, Abdulaziz Sager and Hossein Mousavian, indicated in an article that ‘Track II’ efforts are at work. They urged that ‘now is the time to explore a new foundation for a lasting peace in our region... because the situations in the historic conflict zones are ripe for diplomacy.’⁷⁷ Similarly, in another Op-Ed article co-authored by Saudi and Iranian PhD students at Lancaster University, the focus was on mechanisms to achieve peace and stability. It points out that in the long period of rivalry between the two Gulf countries, the pendulum has swung between tension and rapprochement, which gives hope for better times ahead. The two scholars urge reducing harsh rhetoric, increasing direct dialogue, making political compromises in Syria and Yemen, thus building trust, which could eventually force the two countries to the negotiating table.⁷⁸ Even if Saudi-Iran rapprochement does not yield total peace, China’s diplomatic and security roles in the region could contribute to helping them develop into ‘rivalry partners’ – possibly like China and the U.S. themselves or even like the evolving China-India ties, after realising that war would be disastrously inconclusive. A new arrangement could evolve to simultaneously compete aggressively in some areas

That’s key to regional stability

Cafiero 22 (Giorgio Cafiero – CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, “Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are resurfacing,” 11-21-22,

<https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/11/21/tensions-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia-are-resurfacing/>
//Bos

Yet, considering how much worsening tension between these two powers can bode negatively for stability in the [West Asia] Middle East, exacerbated problems between Tehran and Riyadh could be felt throughout the wider region in many dangerous ways. With Iran and Saudi Arabia both being important powers in the wider Islamic world, the possibility of a more cooperative and less hostile bilateral relationship raised hopes for greater peace and prosperity in the region, particularly in countries such as Yemen, where Tehran and Riyadh’s opposing interests have been one of the drivers of war. Yet, with nasty tensions resurfacing in Iranian-Saudi relations there is less reason to expect progress on complicated regional files which stood to move in the right direction had diplomatic engagement between Tehran and Riyadh continued.